Taleh Ziyadov

How do you assess the current state of the Karabakh negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan? 

There is a lot of optimism about the current state of affairs in the peace process. It would be fair to say that Armenia and Azerbaijan have made a serious progress since 2004. Baku and Yerevan have agreed on most of the outstanding and difficult issues. Now, we have come to a point when the parties may need a final push – a push that could transform the entire region as a whole. So I am too cautiously optimistic.

Do you think it is realistic to expect any breakthroughs in the peace process by the end of this year? If yes, what sort of progress could it be?

Realistically, the only tangible breakthrough that could happen is the signing of the so-called “Basic Principles for the Peaceful Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”. This agreement alone would be enough to trigger a number of developments, including opening of the regional communications between Armenia and Azerbaijan, return of IDPs to their homes, the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, and so on.  Having said that, everything will depend on whether or not President Aliyev and President Sargsyan will be able to agree on a mutually acceptable framework document.

During his recent visit to Azerbaijan, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Hassan Gashgavi said that the Karabakh conflict could only be resolved in the regional framework with participation of regional states, and non-regional actors would not solve the conflict because they pursue their own interests. To what extent are these comments justified?

It is a positive development that regional states have started to show greater interest in the Karabakh peace process. Since 1992, the negotiation process has taken place under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/CSCE), which is a regional organization. Hence the involvement of non-regional actors is within the OSCE Minsk Group framework. Despite its ups and downs, the process has gone a long way and it achieved a lot in helping the two sides to move in the right direction.
Also let’s not forget that the Karabakh conflict itself is as much international as it is regional. In many cases, long-lasting conflicts end up being resolved by the efforts of international community and international organizations, such as the United Nations, and regional states play important role in advancing peace prospects. That is why this conflict has been discussed in other international forums, including the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).  In short, regional and international efforts are not mutually exclusive and they often reinforce each other.
As far as the interests of individual states are concerned, I would say that any state, be it regional or non-regional, has its own interests and its own agenda. The problem is how to make sure these interests align so that all parties become vastly interested in the earlier resolution of the conflict.  And it seems like we are slowly going in that direction.

Do you mean today interests of the regional and international actors overlap vis-à-vis the resolution of the Karabakh conflict?

Over the past few years we have seen some shifts in the regional and global politics. The 2008 August war in Georgia was probably one of the main events that triggered some shifts regionally. Moscow has visibly become active in trying to facilitate meetings between presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Moscow Declaration was the first outcome of this process. The US- Russia rapprochement played a positive role too, so did the warming Turkish-Russian relations. The more interests of regional and international actors converge in seeing a secure and stable South Caucasus, the more chances we have in resolving the Karabakh conflict. Without resolving this conflict, the South Caucasus will never be secure and predictable. So to answer your question, I think today there is much less antagonism between these players and the conflict itself seems to have reached its level of “ripeness”.  

Recently, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan blamed the co-chair countries of the OSCE Minsk Group for not being active enough in the resolution of the Karabakh conflict – referring to the absence of a peace deal for almost twenty years – and called upon them to intensify their efforts in finding a solution soon. The OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, on the other hand, state that they have limited mandate and they cannot apply pressure to Baku and Yerevan to sign an agreement that they do not want.  Which of these two views do you subscribe to?

The issue is probably more complex than “inactivity” of co-chair states or “limitations” in the mandate of the OSCE Minsk Group. Finding a mutual solution to any conflict takes time and there are many factors, both internal and external, that come into play when the parties sit behind that negotiation table. In addition to the challenges they face domestically, too often the parties have to deal with demands and pressures of other players, which may or may not be interested in the sooner resolution of the conflict.  But the longer the conflict stays unresolved, the more difficult it becomes to resolve it. Therefore, it is the primary duty of mediators to make sure that the conflicting parties talk to each other.   
Within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group, Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents and foreign ministers have conducted countless talks. In the past, these talks could have produced a peace deal at least twice: first in 1998 and then again in 1999. But we know what happened: in 1998, the then Armenian President Ter-Petrosian was forced to resign and the October 1999 shooting in the Armenian parliament buried all expectations of a possible peace deal being signed at the OSCE Istanbul meeting in November, 1999.
The inherent challenge within the OSCE Minsk Group framework is the diverging interests of the co-chair countries: France, Russia and the United States. In 1990s, the gap between their interests was considerable. In fact, the activities of the OCSE Minsk Group co-chairs in 1990s resembled the Ivan Krylov’s fable about “Swan, Crawfish, and Pike” where each was pulling a loaded cart in a different direction, thus, causing it to stand still.
The situation has changed greatly, especially since 2004. Although the co-chairs may still have different opinions and interests, today there is a genuine attempt by all to move in one direction. Certainly, the most important shift in the post-2004 phase of the negotiations was the introduction of what is often referred to in the negotiation literature as the “formula to detail” approach. To its credit, the OSCE Minsk Group’s approach has been successful leading to the drafting of the “Basic Principles”. Most of the items in the “Basic Principles” have already been agreed on, leaving only one or two issue to settle. 
As for the OSCE Minsk Group’s limited mandate and lack of “tools” to pressure the conflicting parties, I tend to share the opinion of an American professor and mediator, David Matz, who believes that “the parties come to mediators to reach an agreement they cannot reach themselves” and one of the ways mediators could facilitate this process is “to apply pressure to the parties to help them move toward settlement”.
After all, making sure the parties adhere to the principles of international law, under which the OSCE Minsk Group is acting, can hardly be considered a “pressure”. We have seen many examples when a “friendly encouragement” could produce positive outcomes. The signing of the Moscow Declaration is a good example. Yerevan did not like the content of the Moscow Declaration, nonetheless, it signed it. It is for the same reason why it also signed the Turkish-Armenian protocols.

What do you think will be the fate of the Turkish-Armenian protocols?

If there is no progress in the Karabakh peace process, the Turkish-Armenian protocols would most probably sink into oblivion. Therefore, increasing efforts to achieve a breakthrough in the peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the most logical action that all interested parties should pursue today.

What is the potential of Turkey as a facilitator in the resolution of the Karabakh conflict?

As I stated above, the involvement of regional states in the resolution of the conflict is a positive step. It is better to have an active Turkey than a passive one. Turkey and Azerbaijan share common interests and they are tied to each other on multiple levels. Turkey is a strategic partner of Azerbaijan and it a growing regional power, whose influence will continue to increase in the years to come. Turkey’s involvement has elevated the status of the Karabakh conflict in the regional and international forums.

How sincere is Turkish PM Erdogan when he talks about normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations being dependent on the resolution of the Karabakh conflict?

One thing that any Turkish politician, regardless of his or her political affiliation, has to take into account is the Turkish public. There is tremendous sympathy among the Turkish public for Azerbaijan and the Karabakh cause – a fact that no politician can disregard. In addition, there are strategic, military, political and economic ties between Ankara and Baku that have been built over the past twenty years. These ties cannot be sacrificed in exchange for relatively minor gains. Thus, numerous public statements of Turkish high ranking officials, including PM Erdogan’s, about the link between the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement and the Karabakh conflict should be taken seriously.  

Besides the known position of official Baku that the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement would lead to delaying and complicating the resolution of the Karabakh conflict, there is also a view that this rapprochement could speed up the resolution of the conflict. Which of these two views do you favor?

It depends on the sequence… In principle, I do not think Baku is against the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations. In fact, there have been many attempts in the past to facilitate such normalization by opening a road that would go from Azerbaijan passing via Karabakh and Lachin, to Armenia and into Turkey. These proposals have been on the table with an assumption that the Armenian side would agree to pull out from the occupied Azerbaijani territories. As a matter of good will and to start the process, Armenia could have returned one or two of the occupied territories, which would have led to positive developments in the whole region. Unfortunately, Yerevan preferred to keep the status quo. This certainly raises a question whether the Armenian side is really interested in seeing a breakthrough at all?
So while agreeing that the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement is important and could help the resolution of the Karabakh conflict, it can only happen if the two processes go hand-in-hand.  In other words, without the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal, the Turkish-Armenia rapprochement will be short-lived and incomplete. It would also delay the resolution of the conflict and increase the possibility of a new war. On the other hand, if Baku and Yerevan achieve a breakthrough in the talks this year, it would speed up the Turkish-Armenian normalization process as well. And that would be really transformational!

Taleh Ziyadov is a doctoral fellow at the University of Cambridge (UK). He is specializing in energy, transportation, and geopolitical issues in Central Eurasia. His article analyzing the phases of the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation process from 1994 until 2009 will be published in the upcoming issue of the journal of International Negotiation No. 15 (2010).

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