News.Az interviews Alexey Vlasov, director of Moscow State University's analytical centre on post-Soviet states.
How would you comment on the results of the Sochi meeting on the Karabakh conflict between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia with the mediation of the Russian president?
The details of the document are unknown though the main point lies in the detail. For example, some Russian websites have provided details of negotiations but there is no guarantee that they are accurate. A source close to the negotiating process on the Armenian side has told a number of news agencies that the preamble [which the Russian foreign minister said had been agreed at Sochi] fixed “Nagorno-Karabakh’s imperative participation in future stages in the negotiations, as well as nations’ right to self-determination being a priority in the conflict settlement process”. Is this so? I think the interpretation of the sides' positions will seriously differ. This will be a game of terms and definitions. This is a dangerous game, especially because the exact content of the preamble has not been published. The critical information background to this meeting makes me think that resolution is close. But, in fact, the background to these negotiations should not be taken beyond its context.
We can now see increased activity by Russia as a mediator on the Karabakh settlement. Does this mean that the conflict solution is near, since some experts think the Kremlin holds the key to resolution of the conflict?
I would like to repeat that Baku and Yerevan hold the key to resolution of the Karabakh conflict and I think it is now time for Armenia to speak.
Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian said before the meeting that he does not expect great progress on a resolution in 2010. He said “I do not think a breakthrough will take place in 2010.” Does this indicate a reluctance on the Armenian side to seek further ways to settle the conflict?
I would like to repeat that it is now Armenia’s turn to speak. But President Serzh Sargsyan is in quite a difficult position as his foreign policy has been seriously criticized both inside the country and by the diaspora. Nalbandian’s statements are associated with this. No one wants to take risks, but the situation may develop in such a way that risks have to be taken. Yerevan is waiting for resolution of the problem of the Armenian-Turkish protocols on rapprochement, but if Ankara continues to insist on progress in the Karabakh issue, Armenian diplomacy will face difficult choices – either to stop ratification of the protocols or to make concessions. The position of the mediators is not clear either. In such a contradictory situation the Armenian Foreign Ministry does not want to take risks and is creating a smokescreen to play for time.
What are the prospects for the Karabakh peace process in 2010?
The perspective for the near future is the coordination of common principles and the first definite steps, for example, the liberation of five Azerbaijani districts. It is clear that the Karabakh status will be settled at the next stage, beyond 2010.
Is it possible to expect the coordination of at least the basic settlement principles by the end of the year?
I am still optimistic. However, Lavrov’s remarks on the outcome of the last round of talks are unclear: for example, he said “Today's main result is an agreement that, although there are still some parts of the document that the sides do not yet agree on, they will draw up their specific ideas and specific formulations on those parts and they will be included in the text.” Nevertheless, against the background of the main line aimed at supporting the negotiation process, there are chances for a gradual coordination of the basic principles of a settlement by the end of 2010. I think this year may be a turning point in the Karabakh issue.
Do you think Kazakhstan's chairmanship of the OSCE this year will have any impact on the conflict settlement?
It is easier to give a response about the OSCE and Kazakhstan. I have never doubted that the Karabakh issue will be part of Kazakhstan’s OSCE strategy. Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev said this last year. Meanwhile, State Secretary Saudabayev has already announced that he is planning to visit the South Caucasus countries as the chairman-in-office in mid-February. Yet words and deeds are not the same. The OSCE has no effective levers for the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. I mean in the format which, for example, Baku or Yerevan expect. Certainly, it is possible to hold a special conference on Nagorno-Karabakh or propose two or three special initiatives. But these steps will be unable to bring a cardinal "reformat" to the Karabakh situation. It is possible to add to the initiatives of the main moderators of this process, but I don't think it's possible to play a significant role. The problem lies not with Kazakhstan but with the extreme complexity of the Nagorno-Karabakh situation and the weak mechanisms of the organization itself.
Leyla Tagiyeva
News.Az