Sergey Markedonov

What is Moscow’s role at the current stage in the resolution of the Karabakh conflict? How important is the conflict settlement for the Kremlin?

Moscow’s approaches to the Karabakh conflict have not changed, but one peculiarity today should be taken into account. The negotiations are now being held in the form of Armenian-Turkish normalization, though this is stagnating. But this does not mean that Moscow is concerned about it. Different attempts are made and approaches taken to settle this conflict. In this connection it is important to remember the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Moscow. Russia and Turkey have reached a record level in economic ties. Trade between the two countries has risen dramatically. Russian-Turkish relations today can be compared to US-Turkish relations with some reservations. The United States and Turkey have a high level of military and strategic cooperation close to Armenia. Ankara and Moscow have the same cooperation but on the economic level and with the same proximity to Armenia. The United States and Russia would like to accelerate the Karabakh conflict settlement to show general progress to Turkey and the ability to promote the second process, the one between Armenia and Turkey.

What are Moscow's goals in organizing the presidential meeting in Sochi? How will Russia benefit?

Moscow must always keep abreast of events and have meetings to show for their involvement even if they are practically ineffective. But the situation with Turkey is new in the negotiating process. It has to be considered from different angles. This is quite a new sphere. Today experts talk to Turkey as the fourth de facto, if not de jure, co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group. This is an important factor and all this has to be considered.

How will the situation in the region develop, considering the current state of ties between Armenia and Turkey, Azerbaijan and Russia and the West? Is it possible to make any realistic forecasts?

It is currently impossible to make long-term forecasts. Only short-term and medium-term forecasts are possible. There will be an interval in the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement in the near future. Nevertheless, attempts will be made to promote the Armenian-Turkish negotiations including through compromises on the Karabakh conflict. Overall, the new status quo for the Caucasus is forming more slowly than in the past two years.

Though Turkey, the US, the West and Russia try to settle the Karabakh conflict, there have been no achievements. Do you think that the superpowers are more interested in preservation of the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh than in its settlement?

None of the countries is involved in the settlement process on the basis of completely abstract ideas. Each state has its own interests. Superpowers, primarily, pursue their own goals. Today the status quo seems the best option. Why status quo? Because any conflict is an equation with two unknown quantities. It is unclear when and where something will explode. After the “six day war” with Georgia, any Russian response to the conflict may have bad implications for South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Moscow has strengthened its position on this issue in some areas and weakened it in others by creating new problems. Turkey, which is striving for EU membership, is not interested in a new war in which it will have to support Azerbaijan because Ankara wants to present itself as a peaceful, westernized country. Therefore, any stress may lead to new challenges.

What makes official Baku make bellicose statements?

Baku's radical position is caused by the intensification in Armenian-Turkish reconciliation. Few observers could predict that Yerevan and Ankara would sign legally binding documents rather than declarations in 2009. Though the full formalization of Armenian-Turkish relations has not come yet and the concluded protocols have not yet been ratified, historical enemies have taken a giant step towards each other. This changes Turkey’s role in the region. Ankara is turning from an elder brother for Azerbaijan and a younger brother for NATO into an actor on several Caucasus stages at once. This transformation causes concern in Baku, as Armenia’s isolation from Turkey has been another trump in the Karabakh peace process. The trump has not failed yet though it has devalued. Rationally, Ilham Aliyev understands that in the current conditions raised stakes can be a way to avert the full separation of the Armenian-Turkish process from the Karabakh conflict settlement. This “curbing” is a hope for more profitable results for him and his country.

Would the South Caucasus benefit from a war in Karabakh?

A fast resolution of the Karabakh issue is possible only in the conditions of a blitzkrieg. But the chances are low. The dividing line is consolidated on both sides and an attempt to change it will lead to a long war and the inevitable interference of external powers. Unlike Balkan history, there will not be unilateral support for any of the conflict participants. Opinions will be divided not between Russia and the West but inside Russia, the United States, EU countries, Iran and Turkey. Meanwhile, military difficulties will cause internal political problems and instability inside Azerbaijan and Armenia.

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