Tabib Huseynov

The recent Armenian-Russian military agreements are said to have deepened Armenia's dependence on Russia. Would it therefore make more sense for Azerbaijan to negotiate on Karabakh with Russia, rather than with its outpost Armenia?

This is a rhetorical question, but also one that has little practical value.

In pursuit of their own interests, external powers may facilitate or impede the negotiation process. In this regard, the most worrying provision in the recently signed Russian-Armenian military deal is actually not the extension of Russia’s basing rights or symbolic upgrade of the mission of its troops in Armenia, but a promise to supply Armenia with modern offensive weaponry, possibly long-range precision-guided missiles. The latter provision can hardly be described as helpful to the peace process and casts a shadow on the sincerity of Russia’s mediation efforts.

However, statements to the effect that the solution to the conflict lies in Moscow or elsewhere outside of Armenia and Azerbaijan effectively ignore the fact that these two countries bear the primary responsibility for the continuation of the conflict. Armenia chooses to be an “outpost” of Russia, as you termed it, because it consciously prefers yielding part of its sovereignty to its bigger ally, rather than embracing a compromise solution with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. As long as intransigence in positions remains, both Armenia and Azerbaijan will continue to seek solutions outside and, thus, will remain vulnerable to external manipulation.

May these agreements stiffen Yerevan’s position in the talks with Baku?

Yes, this is a possibility. Armenian officials do not hide that the deal with Russia is part of their strategy to discourage Azerbaijan from acting on its threats to retake its occupied territories by force, should the peace talks fail. Armenian strategy appears to be prolonging the status quo and obstructing concerted international action by Russia, the US and France/EU to press the parties to signing the agreement on basic principles.

Do you think Russia would intervene in the Karabakh conflict if Azerbaijan started war?

First, we should bear in mind that the likelihood of a resumption of hostilities by either side in the near future is small. Besides, let’s not forget that not only Russia, but also the US and the EU strongly oppose the war option and will pressure both parties to give up on such plans.

But to answer your question directly, the Collective Security Treaty obliges Russia to defend Armenia only in the event of external aggression. As you may recall, Azerbaijani officials have in the past said that in the event of a renewal of hostilities Azerbaijani troops would operate only in Nagorno-Karabakh. Therefore, from a technical-legal standpoint, Armenia cannot evoke mutual defence obligations if hostilities are limited to Azerbaijan’s occupied territories. But in practice, if hostilities resume, they are unlikely to be limited to Azerbaijan’s occupied territories. Perhaps in smaller scale, hostilities would take place also along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. Therefore, Russia has broad discretionary power in interpreting its obligations towards Armenia. This gives Russia huge political leverage over both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

In any case, Azerbaijan is highly unlikely to deliberately go to war without making sure that Russia would, at a minimum, stay neutral.

Could the location of a Turkish military base in Azerbaijan be considered an effective response to the strengthening of Armenian-Russian military cooperation?

To achieve a peaceful solution, Azerbaijan needs concerted international efforts to impress on Armenia to withdraw from its hardline position of making any progress in the talks conditional on the determination of Nagorno-Karabakh’s final status. To retain and strengthen international efforts, official Baku should be interested in reducing regional polarization, not facilitating it. Accordingly, the further development of Turkish-Russian relations, which have greatly improved in recent years, is a far better option than hastily inviting Turkish troops to be stationed in Azerbaijan as a counterbalance to Russian troops in Armenia.

As you may recall, the most dynamic phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh talks, which lasted throughout 2009, coincided with a time when the international community, including Russia, had increased their attention to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and cooperated quite constructively, sharing a similar vision based on peaceful resolution of the conflict within the framework of basic principles. It is important that the international actors retain and strengthen their concerted efforts. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan need to accept the framework document on basic principles and swiftly move on to working out the details of a comprehensive peace agreement.

May Azerbaijan secure itself from military agreements between Moscow and Yerevan by strengthening military cooperation with Russia itself?

It is important that Azerbaijan retains and further develops good neighbourly relations with Russia. But Azerbaijan is highly unlikely to develop military ties with Russia to a degree comparable with Armenia. First, any substantial military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Russia would be tainted by the already existing Russian-Armenian mutual defence agreements. Second, Armenia yielded its sovereignty to a foreign power – Russia – to secure itself from Azerbaijan and potentially, from Turkey. Azerbaijan, unlike Armenia, will not yield its sovereignty to a foreign power and will pursue equal relations with all external powers.

W.W.
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